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Abstract
Total factor productivity growth (TFPG) has been traditionally associ-
ated with technological change. We show that when a factor of production,
such as energy, generates an environmental externality in the form of CO2
emissions which is not internalized because of lack of environmental policy,
then TFPG estimates could be biased. This is because the contribution
of environment as a factor of production is not accounted for in the growth
accounting framework. Empirical estimates confirm this hypothesis and sug-
gest that part of what is regarded as technology’s contribution to growth
could be attributed to the use of environment in output production.
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1 Introduction
The sources of economic growth is an issue which has received much atten-
tion in economic science. One of the most popular and successful ways of
summarizing the contribution of factors of production and technology to out-
put growth is the growth accounting framework introduced by Solow (Solow
1957). Growth accounting allows for a breakdown of output growth into its
sources which are the factors of production and technological progress, and
makes possible the estimation of the contribution of each source to output
growth. Growth accounting leads to the well known concept of the Solow
residual, which measures total factor productivity growth (TFPG). TFPG is
the part of output growth not attributed to the use of factors of production
such a capital or labour, but to technical change.3 A strong positive TFPG
has been regarded as a desirable characteristic of the growth process since,
given the growth of conventional factors of production, it further promotes
output growth. However, there are still conceptual disputes about the sub-
ject, and Easterly and Levine (2001) note for example that “economists need
to provide much more shape and substance to the amorphous term TFP”.
In this paper we try to provide some additional “shape” by seeking to study
the concept of TFPG when inputs which generate negative environmental
externalities are used in production.
In the traditional growth accounting framework TFPG is what remains
from output growth after the contribution of the factors used to produce
output is subtracted. This residual has been traditionally attributed to
3During the last decades many diﬀerent approaches have been used to measure TFPG.
They include primal approaches using factor quantities, dual approaches using factor
prices instead of factor quantities, and approaches which basically involve disaggregation
and refinement of inputs in the production function. For presentation of these approaches
and extended references, see for example Barro (1999), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
Recent TFPG estimates are reported in Baier et al. (2006).
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accumulation of knowlwdge and advances in engineering. In this framework
the contribution of each factor is measured by the factor’s share in total
output multiplied by the factor’s rate of growth. To obtain this share the
factor’s cost, as it is determined in a market economy, is used.
However, what if a factor is used in the production process but its cost is
not accounted for in a market economy? That is, what if an unpaid factor is
contributing to growth? This question is far from hypothetical since it has
been understood in the recent decades that environment has been used as
a factor of production. The environment is used in general for depositing
by-products of the production process, the most striking example being the
emission of greenhouse gasses which have been closely associated evidence
with severe negative externalities such as global warming and climate change
(e.g. The Stern Report, 2006). When the cost of the environmental exter-
nality is not internalized in a market economy due to lack of an appropriate
environmental policy, the use of the environment is equivalent to the use
of an unpaid factor in the production of output. If however environment
is an unpaid factor which contributes to growth, then at least part of what
we think is TFPG is in fact the unaccounted contribution of environmen’t
to output growth. Thus, positive TFPG estimates that might suggest a
“healthy” growth process could, at least partly, embody the unaccounted
contribution of the environment. When this contribution is accounted for
TFPG might not be as strongly positive and the growth process might not
be as “healthy” as we think, since the unpaid factor is excessively and in-
eﬃciently used. For example, a negative TFPG after the contribution of
the environment is accounted for, could be interpreted as indicating that
the “value‘ of the factors we use exceeds the “value” of what we produce
by these factors. Negative TFPG estimates have been explained by institu-
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tional changes and conflicts (Baier et al. 2006). Our paper suggests another
reason, the presense of an externality which results in an unaccounted, by
the growth accounting framework, use of a factor of production. Analyzing
the contribution of unpaid factors in the growth process could also have po-
tentially significant policy implications. Given the fact that many economies
have been characterized by hight growth rates, one might want to examine
whether and to what extend unpaid factors are contributing to this growth,
and analyze what kind of policy is required in order to internalize the cost
of these factors and thus use them eﬃciently.4
In order to capture the contribution of environment as an unpaid factor
in growth accounting, environment’s use in output production should be
modelled. One way of doing this is by directly introducing emissions in the
production function in the way originally proposed by Brock (1973).5 When
emissions are treated as a factor of production then a growth accounting ex-
ercise shows that the “traditional” TFPG measurements6 will be in general
biased since they do not account for the emissions, and thus environment’s
contribution to output growth.7
Another way of modelling environment’s contribution to output growth,
which might be more appropriate in the context of a market economy is
to introduce as an input in the aggregate production function a factor of
production which is “paid” in conventional terms, but which at the same
time generates and “unpaid” or “uninternalized” environmental externality.
4TFP growth can be also influenced by positive externalities. Madsen (2008) shows
that this applies to the case of the international patent stock which along with knowledge
spillovers through the channel of imports, has contributed significantly to TFP growth.
In this paper we concentrate on the impact of negative externalities.
5See also Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993), or Xepapadeas (2005).
6We use the term ‘traditional’ TFPG for TFPG measures where unpaid factors or
externalities are not taken into account.
7For theoretical analysis see Dasgupta and Maler (2000), Xepapadeas (2005). For an
empirical application see Tzouvelekas et al. (2007).
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In the context of externalities associated with climate change it is energy
which is the input clearly satisfying this requirement.8 Although energy
is paid as a factor of production in a market economy, there is also an
unpaid part of energy which is associated to an uninternalized environmental
externality. This is the greenhouse gasses (GHGs) and in particular carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions (or GHGs equivalent CO2 emissions) generated by
energy use. These emissions can be regarded as an unpaid environmental
externality since no carbon tax policy has in general been applied until the
relatively recent Kyoto protocol, which also applies to a subset only of GHGs
generating countries.
Thus the purpose of the present paper is to develop a conceptual frame-
work and to provide estimates of the impact of the uninternalized (or un-
paid) part of energy, which is environmental externalities generated by emis-
sions of GHGs in TFPG measurements. In this context we derive first an
externality-adjusted TFPGmeasure using an optimal growth model with en-
ergy as a factor of production and pollution accumulation which generates
disutility, and then obtain empirical estimates of the externality adjusted
TFPG by applying our methodology to a panel of OECD countries. Our
results suggests that TFPG measurements are significantly aﬀected when
the external cost of emissions associated with energy use is, up to a certain
extend, internalized.
In particular, we develop a growth accounting framework based on neo-
classical growth theory and we measure TFPG by regarding energy as a
factor of production which is not fully paid, in the sense that market prices
for energy do not cover both private costs and external costs associated with
energy use. When however we try to interpret the energy’s share on output
8This means that the aggregate production function would be of the so called KLE
form (Griﬃn 1981, Griﬃn and Gregory 1976).
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in the context of competitive equilibrium there is a problem at the empiri-
cal level if energy related externalities are not internalized. If we estimate
TFPG for a period when no environmental policy, such a taxation, tradeable
permits, or command and control measures, has been applied to emissions
associated with energy use, then traditional TFPG estimates based on the
use of factors’ share on output will be biased. This is because the share of
the emissions “part” of energy on output is zero due to lack of environmental
policy, which if existed, would have charged this part with its external cost.9
We correct for this bias and arrive at an externality-adjusted TFPG by ap-
propriately adjusting, for the external cost of CO2 emissions, traditional
TFPG measures obtained by estimating an aggregate production function
for a panel 23 OECD countries, with energy used is an input in the produc-
tion function.
The adjustment is carried out by subtracting the contribution of the un-
paid (or uninternalized) part of energy costs, that is CO2 emissions, from
output growth. To value this contribution we use current estimates of the
marginal damages from CO2 emissions. Our results suggest that when the
emission’s part of energy valued by marginal damages from CO2 emissions is
accounted for in the growth accounting measurements, then the externality-
adjusted Solow residual, or the externality-adjusted TFPG is reduced rela-
tive to the traditional TFPG estimates and might take even negative values.
A negative Solow residual would imply that when all factors used in the pro-
duction process are paid for their contribution to total output growth, then
the contribution of technological progress to output growth is outweighed by
the use of factors of production which generate uniternalized externalities.
9The bias emerges because the social marginal products deviate from private marginal
products, due to the existence of uninternalized externalities.
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2 The Solow Residual with Externality Generat-
ing Inputs
We start with a standard neoclassical production function:
Y = F (K,H,AL,BE) (1)
where K is physical capital, H is human capital, AL is eﬀective labour with
L being labor in physical units and A reflecting labor augmenting technical
change, BE is eﬀective input of energy with E being energy in physical
units and B reflecting energy augmenting technical change, . Diﬀerentiating
(1) with respect to time, and denoting by j , j = K,H,L,E the elasticity
of output with respect to inputs, the basic growth accounting equation is
obtained as:
Y˙
Y
= K
Ã
K˙
K
!
+ H
Ã
H˙
H
!
+L
Ã
A˙
A
!
+ L
Ã
L˙
L
!
+ E
Ã
B˙
B
!
+E
Ã
E˙
E
!
(2)
We assume that energy is related to emissions by the following function:
E (t) = φ (Z (t)) (3)
where Z (t) is emissions created by the use of energy E at time t. We
assume that φZ > 0, φZZ ≥ 0 and that the inverse function exist, so we can
alternatively express emissions as a function of energy use10:
Z (t) = φ−1 (E (t)) = ψ (E (t)) (4)
10As we show in the section of the paper where competitive equilibruim is analyzed, ex-
istence of a competitive equilibruim when the emissions incorporated into a given amount
of energy are taxed, requires a simple proportional relationship between energy and emis-
sions.
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diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to time and dividing by E we obtain:
E˙
E
= EZ
Ã
Z˙
Z
!
(5)
where EZ is the elasticity of energy with respect to emissions from (3).
Then (2) becomes:
Y˙
Y
= K
Ã
K˙
K
!
+ H
Ã
H˙
H
!
+ L
Ã
A˙
A
!
+ L
Ã
L˙
L
!
+ E
Ã
B˙
B
!
+ EEz
Ã
Z˙
Z
!
(6)
Therefore the growth accounting equation can be expressed either in
terms of energy by (2) or in terms of emissions by (6). To transform (6) into
a growth accounting equation in factor shares we use profit maximization in
a competitive market set up. Profits for the representative competitive firm
are defined as:
π = F (K,H,AL,BE)−RKK −RHH − wL− pEE − τψ (E) (7)
where pE is the competitive price for energy and τ is an exogenous emis-
sion tax or an exogenous price for tradable emission permits. First-order
conditions for profit maximization imply that input shares are defined as:
sK =
RKK
Y
, sH =
RHH
Y
, sL =
wL
Y
, sE =
pEE + τψ0(E)E
Y
(8)
It should be noted that the share of energy, sE, consists of two parts. The
part paid for energy in energy markets, pEEY , and the share corresponding to
the cost of emissions generated by energy τψ
0(E)E
Y . If τ reflects the external
cost of emissions then this share is the share of externality in total output. If
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τ = 0 then the externality is not internalized and the use of the environment
as factor of production is unpaid. Thus the externality adjusted TFPG or
the externality adjusted Solow residual can be defined in terms of energy as:
γE = sL
Ã
A˙
A
!
+sE
Ã
B˙
B
!
=
Y˙
Y
−sK
Ã
K˙
K
!
−sH
Ã
H˙
H
!
−sL
Ã
L˙
L
!
−sE
Ã
E˙
E
!
(9)
or in terms of emissions as:
γZ = sL
Ã
A˙
A
!
+sE
Ã
B˙
B
!
=
Y˙
Y
−sK
Ã
K˙
K
!
−sH
Ã
H˙
H
!
−sL
Ã
L˙
L
!
−sE
Ã
EZ
Ã
Z˙
Z
!!
Under constant returns to scale (9) becomes:
γE =
y˙
y
− sK
k˙
k
− sH
h˙
h
− sE
e˙
e
(10)
It can be seen from (10) that the contribution of the environment in
TFPG is reflected in the term sE e˙e . This indicates that there is one more
source generating output growth, the environment used as an input in pro-
duction in addition to capital and labour. Thus, in order to obtain a ”net”
estimate of TFPG the environment’s contribution should be properly ac-
counted. Relationships (9) and (10) can be considered as externality ad-
justed growth accounting equations and γ is the ”externality adjusted Solow
residual”. In order to provide a meaningful definition of the TFPG for em-
pirical estimation, when environment is an input, we need to clarify what
is meant by the share of energy in output. This is because the total cost
of energy includes apart from the price of energy that is accounted for in
the measurements since energy has a market price, the potentially untaxed
value of emissions that energy creates. In this case we have an unpaid part
for the energy input in the growth accounting equation.
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2.1 Interpreting the Shares of Inputs in the Externality Ad-
justed TFPG measurements:
2.1.1 The Social Planner
To interpret the share of energy when energy use releases emissions which
are an environmental externality, we consider the problem of a social plan-
ner who maximizes a standard Ramsey-Koopmans functional defined over
consumption and environmental damages. We determine an optimal tax τ ,
which would internalize the externalities that the emission’s part of energy
creates during the production process. We assume that emissions accumu-
late into the ambient environment and that the evolution of the emission
stock S is described by the first order diﬀerential equation:
S˙ (t) = Z (t)−mS (t) , S (0) = S0,m > 0 (11)
S˙ (t) = ψ (E)−mS (t) , ψ (E) = Z = φ−1 (E) (12)
where m reflects the environment’s self cleaning capacity11. The stock of
emissions generate damages according to a strictly increasing and convex
damage function D (S) , D
0
> 0,D
00 ≥ 0.
Assume that utility for the ”average person” is defined by a function
U (c (t) , S (t)) where c (t) is consumption per capita, c (t) = C (t) /N (t) ,
with N (t) being population. We assume that Uc (c, S) > 0, US (c, S) < 0
UcS (c, S) ≤ 0, that U is concave in c for fixed S, and finally that U is homo-
geneous in (c, S) . Then social utility at time t is defined asN (t)U (c (t) , S (t)) =
N0entU (c (t) , S (t)) where n is the exogenous population (and labour force)
11We use a very simple pollution accumulation process which has been often used to
model global warming. The inclusion of environmental feedbacks and nonlinearities which
represent more realistic situations are an area of further research but we expect that it
will not change the basic results.
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growth rate and N0 can be normalized to one. The objective of the social
planner is to choose consumption and energy paths to maximize:
max
{c(t),E(t)}
Z ∞
0
e−(ρ−n)tU (c, S) dt (13)
where, ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference, subject to the dynamics of
the capital stock and the emission stock (12). The capital stock dynamics
can be described in the following way. Assume a constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas specification for the production function (1):
Y = Ka1Ha2 (AL)a3 (BE)a4 (14)
where and E (t) = φ (Z (t)) as defined above. Expressing output in per
worker terms we obtain:
y = eζtka1ha2Ea4 , ζ = xa3 + a4(b− n)
where labor augmenting technical change grows at the constant rate x, en-
ergy augmenting technical change grows at a constant rate b, and as usual
y = YL , k =
K
L , c =
C
L , h =
H
L and eL =
E
L are expressed in per capita (or per
worker) terms. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin, we assume equality of
depreciation rates and equality of marginal products between manufactured
and human capital in equilibrium. Then, the social planner’s problem can
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be written as:12
max
{cˆ(t),E(t)}
Z ∞
0
e−ωtU (cˆ, S) dt , ω = ρ− n− (1− θ) ξ (15)
subject to: (16)
·
kˆ = f
³
kˆ, E
´
− cˆ− pE eˆL − (η + δ + ξ) kˆ, f
³
kˆ, E
´
= sA˜kˆβEa4(17)
S˙ = ψ (E)−mS, Z = ψ (E) (18)
with k = kˆeξt, h = hˆeξt, c = cˆeξt and eL = eˆLeξt, where
³
kˆ, hˆ, cˆ, eˆ
´
denotes
per eﬀective worker magnitudes and ξ = ζ1−a1−a2 . The current value Hamil-
tonian for this problem is:
H =U (cˆ, S) + p
h
f
³
kˆ, E
´
− cˆ− pE eˆL − (η + δ + ξ) kˆ
i
+ λ (ψ (E, t)−mS)
(19)
The optimality conditions implied by the maximum principle are:
Ucˆ (cˆ, S) = p , Ucˆcˆ (cˆ, S)
·
cˆ+ UcˆS (cˆ, S) S˙ = p˙ (20)
p
∙
fE
³
kˆ, E
´
− pE
e−ξt
L
¸
= −λψ0 (E) (21)
·
cˆ
cˆ
=
1
θ
h
fkˆ
³
kˆ, g
³
kˆ, λ, Ucˆ (cˆ, S) , lˆ
´´
− ρ− δ − θξ
i
− UcˆS (cˆ, S)
Ucˆcˆ (cˆ, S)
S˙ (22)
λ˙ = (ω +m)λ− US (cˆ, S) (23)
The system of (22), (23) along with the two diﬀerential equation below:
·
kˆ = f
³
kˆ, g
³
kˆ, λ, Ucˆ (cˆ, S) , lˆ
´´
− cˆ− pE eˆL − (η + δ + ξ) kˆ (24)
S˙ = ψ
h
g
³
kˆ, λ, Ucˆ (cˆ, S) , lˆ
´
, t
i
−mS (25)
form a dynamic system, which along with the appropriate transversality con-
12For the derivation see Appendix 1.
12
ditions at infinity (Arrow and Kurz 1970) characterizes the socially optimal
paths of
³
cˆ, kˆ, λ, S,E
´
.
As it is well known the costate variable λ (t) can be interpreted as the
shadow cost of the emission stock S (t). Using the interpretation of λ (t) ,
it can be shown by comparing (21) with the profit maximizing conditions
implied by (7) that if a time dependent tax τ (t) = − −λlˆp is chosen, then
firms will choose the socially optimal amount of energy as input.
Then the energy share can be written as:
sE =
£
pE + τψ0(E)
¤
E
Y
, with τ =
−λlˆ
p
=
−λlˆ
Uc
(26)
Thus the share of energy on output along the optimal path consists of
two parts. The first one is associated with the market price of the energy
used in production and the second part is associated with the tax imposed
on the emissions created by the use of energy as a factor of production.
This second part reflects the cost of externality associated with the use of
energy in production. Under the optimal emission tax it can be shown
that the solution of the competitive equilibrium will coincide with the social
planners solution.
2.1.2 Competitive equilibrium
The representative consumer considers the stock of pollution as exogenous
and chooses consumption to maximize lifetime utility, or:
max
c(t)
Z ∞
0
e−(ρ−n)tU (c, S) dt (27)
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subject to the budget flow constraint:
a˙ = w + ra− c− na+ τz (28)
where a is per capita assets, c per capita consumption, w, r the compet-
itive wage rate and interest rate respectively and τz are per capita lump
sum transfers due to environmental taxation, where z = Z/L per capita
emissions. The representative firm maximizes profits and in equilibrium
a = k + h. Then the following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 1 Under an optimal tax τ = −λlˆp of the emission content of
energy used, the paths
³
cˆ (t) , kˆ (t) , S (t) , Z (t)
´
of a decentralized competitive
equilibrium coincide with the socially-optimal paths13.
3 Estimating an Externality Adjusted TFPG
The theoretical framework developed above suggests that in order to obtain
the “correct” share of energy in output for TFPG measurements the cost of
environmental externality should be properly accounted for. However, when
we seek empirical estimates of this “correct share” of emissions in CO2 (or
CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases) created by the use of energy, these emis-
sions do not have a “price” in the absence of environmental policy14. Thus
in applied TFPG measurements we might not account for the contribution
of the part of the energy input which is associated with the generation of
the environmental externality and which remains unpaid if the price of en-
ergy does not include an environmental tax (optimal or not) or any other
13See proof in Appendix 2.
14A “price” in this case could be an environmental tax for the period we analyze, a
traditional permit system with a well defined emission permit price or a binding emission
limit. Such a type of ‘price’ did not emerged untill Kyoto.
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policy instrument. Thus, traditional TFPG measurements can be biased.
If emissions were taxed at a rate τ > 0, environment could be regarded
as a paid factor of production and the externalities created by the use of
energy would be, at last partly, internalized. If however emissions are not
subject to any regulatory policy (which has been the most the usual case
in reality) environment is an unpaid factor of production and we need in-
dependent estimates of the shadow cost of emission, λ (t) to adjust TFPG
measurements.
To further study the possible bias in TFPG and the nature of the exter-
nality adjustment we use again the Cobb-Douglas production function (14),
under constant returns to scale in the log linear specification:
ln y = a0 + (xa3 + ba4)t+ a1 ln k + a2 lnh+ a4 ln eZ ,
4X
i=1
ai = 1 (29)
where:
xa3 + ba4 = γE = TFPG (30)
In (30), γE is TFPG defined in (9) which includes both labor augmenting
(xa3) and energy augmenting (ba4) technical change. Thus in principle
TFPG can be obtained by estimating the parameters of (29). As shown in
the previous section under an optimal environmental policy the energy share
is defined as:
sE =
¡
pE + τψ0
¢
E
Y
(31)
When there is no environmental policy then τ = 0 and the energy share is
simply:
sE =
pEE
Y
(32)
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When input elasticities are estimated from (29), it is clear that if data
correspond to a period where no policy with respect to GHGs was present,
then the estimated energy share, a4, will be (32) and not the correct share
(31). Thus TFPG estimates will be biased. The estimates of (29) can be
used however to estimate an externality adjusted TFPG.
Let (γˆE, sˆK , sˆH , sˆE) = (xa3 + ba4, a1, a2, a4) the TFPG and the elasticity
estimates obtained from (29), then using (10) and (31), (32) the externality
adjusted TFPG can be obtained as:
γAE =
y˙
y
− sˆK
k˙
k
− sˆH
h˙
h
− sˆE
e˙
e
− τψ
0E
Y
(33)
γAE = γˆE −
τψ0E
Y
(34)
Estimates of (29) are usually obtained from panel data so that an overall
estimate of TFPG is obtained through (33) or (34). Individual country
estimates can be obtained by using the estimated shares sˆK , sˆH , sˆE from
(29) and the average growth rates of output and inputs per worker for each
one of the countries in the panel. The individual country estimates for
i = 1, ..., n countries in the panel can be obtained as:
γˆiE =
−µ
y˙
y
¶
i
− sˆK
−Ã
k˙
k
!
i
− sˆH
−Ã
h˙
h
!
i
− sˆE
−µ
e˙
e
¶
i
(35)
Then the individual country externality adjusted TFPG estimate, will
be obtained as:
γAiE = γˆiE −
τψ0Ei
Yi
(36)
16
3.1 Results
Our estimates of the externality adjusted TFPG are obtained in two steps.
In the first step factor shares are estimated from (29) and in the second the
adjustments indicated by (33) or by (36) are carried out. Our data refer
to a panel of 23 OECD countries for the years 1965-1990. Although the
data set is not very recent, it represents a period where no CO2 policy was
present and therefore over this time period energy can be assumed as an
externality generating input without any internalization, which is exactly
the concept we are using in the development of our theoretical model.15
Thus, this not so recent data set, can be regarded as an appropriate data
set for testing the hypothesis that some of the output growth attributed to
technological progress, for the period 1965-1990, should be attributed to the
uninternalized environmental externality. The estimates of the production
function are shown in table 1.
Table 1: Production Function Estimation
15We used data on real GDP, Capital per worker, Population and Real GDP per worker
from the Penn Tables v5.6.
Primary energy data measured in mtoe were obtained fron the International Energy
Agency.
For H use as proxyan index constructed from education data. This index is defined as
Hit = exp(φ (jt)). Where jt is average years in education in country i at year t, and φ
is a piecewise linear function with zero intercept and slope 0.134 for jt ≤ 4, 0.101 for
4 < jt ≤ 8, and 0.068 for jt > 8.(see Hall and Jones (1999); Henderson and Russel
(2005)). Data on education were obtained from the World Bank, World Development
Indicators (2002).
Data on CO2 emissions in kt were also obtained from the World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators (2002).
All data in physical units were transformed to indexes. For the construction of the
index for each variable the mean value for this variable over the whole sample was used
as the base, or xit = yit/y¯, y¯ = 1n+T
?n
i=1
?T
t=1 yit, where y is variable in physical units
and x is the corresponding index.
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Parameters and Statistics Estimates∗
a1 = sˆK 0.298
a2 = sˆH 0.027
a4 = sˆE 0.16
Traditional TFPG, γˆE (%) 1.21
R2 0.99
DW 2.08
∗All estimated parameters are highly significant.
The results suggest that physical capital’s share in output is 29.8%, the
corresponding share of energy as an input at 16% and the corresponding
share for education which is used as a proxy for human capital is 2.7%. The
estimate of the overall total factor productivity growth (γˆE) is 1.21%.
It should be noted that the estimation of (29) represents estimation of
a primal model, that might suﬀer from endogeneity associated with inputs.
This would implying inconsistency in the estimates of the production func-
tion. However as it has been shown by Mundlak (1996, proposition 3) under
constant returns to scale OLS estimates of a k-input Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function in average productivity form with regressors in inputs-labour
ratio, are consistent. This is however exactly the type of production function
we have in our model.
To estimate (29) we adopt a panel estimation approach with “fixed ef-
fects” to allow for unobservable “country eﬀects” (e.g. Islam (1995). As
shown by Mundlak (1996) this estimator applied to the primal problem is
superior to the dual estimator which is applied to the dual functions. Fur-
thermore the “fixed eﬀects” estimator addresses the problem of correlation
between the constant term γE, which is the TFPG estimate, with the regres-
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sors16. The estimation was performed using weighted least squares (WLS)
in order to take into account both cross-section heteroscedasticity and con-
temporaneous correlation among countries in the sample.17
The overall average traditional TFPG obtained in table 1 is adjusted
for the uninternalized environmental externality using (34). In order to
perform the adjustment indicated by (34) we need the parameters ψ0 and τ .
We obtain ψ0 as the coeﬃcient of the relationship Z = σE, where σ = ψ0.
This parameter was obtained by a regression of energy on CO2 emissions
with all variables measured in physical units, (mtoe for energy and ktn
for CO2 emissions)18. Parameter τ , should be interpreted as the cost of
externality. For this parameter we used a value of τ = 20$/tCO2. This value
is taken from Tol (2005) and represents the marginal damage cost of CO2
emissions. Thus, to obtain the externality adjusted TFPG, we approximate
the environmental policy parameter τ , by the marginal damage of CO2
emissions. Using the overall sample averages of the input energy (E) and
output (Y ) for the 23 the adjustment results are shown in table 2.
Table 2: Traditional (γˆE) and Externality Adjusted
¡
γAE
¢
TFPG (%)
16This correlation has been regarded as one of the disadvantages of the regression ap-
proach in TFPG measurement (Barro 1999, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).
17The estimation is carried out in two steps. In the first step the model is estimated
via simple OLS. Using the obtained residuals the conditional country specific variance is
calculated and it is used to transform both the dependent and independent variables of the
second-stage regression. Specifically for each country, yi and each element of xi (indepen-
dent variables) are divided by the estimate of the conditional standard deviation obtained
from the first-stage. Then a simple OLS is performed to the transformed observations
expressed as deviations of their means. This procedure results in a feasible generalized
least square estimator described by Wooldridge ( 2000, Ch. 8) and Greene (2003, Ch.
11). EViews panel estimation with cross-section SUR option was used for estimating the
production function.
18The value of the coeﬃcient is 2.43 and this value is highly significant with R2 = 99%.
Correction for first order autoregression of the residuals was performed. The first order
autoregressive coeﬃcient was significant.
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Traditional TFPG
(1)
0.012
Adjustment for Externality : τψ
0(E)E
Y
(2)
0.019
Externality Adjusted TFPG
(3) = (1)− (2)
−0.007
As seen in table 2, the adjustment for the externality exceeds the tradi-
tional TFPG estimate and therefore the overall externality adjusted TFPG
is negative. This result suggests that, if the externality associated with en-
ergy use is internalized at a cost of 20$/tCO2 then the part of output growth
attributed to technological change, for the period 1965-1990 vanishes, or to
put it diﬀerently the positive contributions of technological change to output
growth during 1965-1990 has been counterbalanced by the negative exter-
nality generated in the process of output growth during the same period.
The impact of externality is realized however only when this externality is
internalized.
The results of the individual country externality adjusted TFPG ob-
tained by using the estimated shares of the production function and the
average values of each type of capital for each one of the countries under
analysis are summarized in table 2 that follows. The first column shows the
countries we analyze, the second columns shows the traditional TFPG esti-
mates through (35), while the third column shows the externality adjusted
TFPG estimates obtained by using (36).
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Table 3: Traditional (γˆiE) and Externality Adjusted
¡
γAiE
¢
TFPG (%)
Countries Traditional TFPG Externality Adjusted TFPG
CANADA 0.670 -1.979
U.S.A. 0.275 -2.206
AUSTRIA 0.635 -0.779
BELGIUM 1.079 -1.039
DENMARK 0.321 -1.289
FINLAND 1.144 -1.107
FRANCE 0.705 -0.778
GREECE 0.831 -0.479
ITALY 1.537 0.387
LUXEMBOURG 1.699 -2.580
PORTUGAL 1.690 0.649
SPAIN 0.415 -0.695
SWEDEN -0.040 -2.028
SWITZERLAND -0.059 -1.122
U.K 0.859 -0.896
JAPAN 1.646 0.235
ICELAND 0.473 -2.533
IRELAND 1.638 -0.172
NETHERLANDS 0.489 -1.414
NORWAY 1.564 -0.247
AUSTRALIA 0.567 -1.226
MEXICO 0.330 -0.814
TURKEY 1.420 0.214
Averages 0.865 -0.952
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The pattern is very similar to the result obtained in table 2. When
the externality is internalized at 20$/tCO2 only four externality adjusted
TFPG estimates remain positive. Sensitivity analysis was performed using
two arbitrary values for τ , τ = 10$/tCO2 and τ = 5$/tCO2. The results
indicate that the externality adjusted TFPG estimates turn positive for all
countries when τ = 5$/tCO2.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper seeks to extend the traditional measurement of TFPG by tak-
ing into account the use of the environment, proxied by the use of energy,
as an input in the production process which is not paid its social cost in
the absence of environmental policy. We obtain externality adjusted TFPG
estimates by subtracting from output growth, the contribution of the un-
paid part of energy which is associated with CO2 emissions created during
the production process, but which are not accounted for in the traditional
TFPG measurements due to the lack of environmental policy. We use cur-
rent estimates of the marginal damages from CO2 emissions to value the
uninternalized part of energy. Our results indicate that our externality ad-
justed residual measurements could be significantly diﬀerent from traditional
TFPG estimates depending on the the marginal CO2 emission damages. If
this value is close to 20$/tCO2 then the residual takes negative values, that
is: when each input, including environment, used in the production process
is fully paid for its contribution in total output growth then no TFPG can
be detected. Thus our result suggests that uninternalized environmental
externalities at a global level might be another reason for having negative
TFPG estimates along with institutional changes and conflicts suggested by
Baier et al. (2006). Our results seems to support therefore the idea that
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part of what has been regarded as TFPG is actually the ”unpaid” part of the
environment use in production which counterbalances the impact of tech-
nology and knowledge accumulation. Whether this part is suﬃciently large
so that TFPG is non existent at all for a certain time period, is an issue that
largely depends on the estimates of environmental damages. Nevertheless,
there seems to be strong empirical support to the idea that at least part of
what has been thought as TFPG is the unaccounted use of the environment
in the growth process.
Appendix 1
Derivation of the Social Planner’s Problem
Net investment is total output minus consumption, energy cost, and
depreciation of human and man made capital. Capital accumulation in per
worker terms, assuming that the two capital goods depreciate at the same
constant rate δ, (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) is given by:
·
k +
·
h = y − c− pEeL − (η + δ)(k + h) (37)
where pE is the price of energy in terms of consumption. Set k = kˆeξt
and h = hˆeξt, c = cˆeξt and eL = eˆLeξt so that
·
k =
·
kˆeξt + ξkˆeξt and
·
h =
·
hˆeξt + ξhˆeξt. Substituting
·
k and
·
h in (37) and dividing by eξt we
obtain:
·
kˆ +
·
hˆ = e(ζ−ξ+a1ξ+a2ξ)tkˆa1 hˆa2Ea4 − cˆ− pE eˆL − (η + δ + ξ)(kˆ + hˆ)
to make the above equation time independent we choose ξ such that ζ− ξ+
a1ξ + a2ξ = 0 or ξ = ζ1−a1−a2 =
xa3+a4(b−n)
1−a1−a2 . Then,
·
kˆ +
·
hˆ = kˆa1 hˆa2Ea4 − cˆ− pE eˆL − (η + δ + ξ)(kˆ + hˆ) (38)
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We assume that the allocation between physical and human capital is such
that the marginal products for each type of capital are equated in equilib-
rium if both forms of investment are used (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).19
The equality between marginal products implies a one to one relationship
between physical and human capital, or:
a1
yˆt
kˆt
− δ = a2
yˆt
hˆt
− δ, hˆ = a2
a1
kˆ,
·
hˆ =
a2
a1
·
kˆ (39)
Using (39) in (38) we obtain:
·
kˆ = A˜kˆβEa4 − αcˆ− pEαeˆL − (η + δ + ξ) kˆ, (40)
A˜ =
µ
aa22 a1
aa21 (a1 + a2)
¶
, β = a1 + a2, α =
µ
a1
a1 + a2
¶
By slightly abusing notation and in order to simplify relationships we keep
using in the text cˆ and eˆL, instead of αcˆ and αeˆL in the capital accumulation
equations similar to (40) since the results are not aﬀected. Considering a
utility function U (c, S) = 11−θc
1−θS−γ θ, γ > 0 we obtain using the
substitution c = cˆeξt.
U (c, S) =
1
1− θc
1−θS−γ =
1
1− θ
³
cˆeξt
´1−θ
S−γ = (41)
= e(1−θ)ξt
1
1− θ cˆ
1−θS−γ = e(1−θ)ξtU (cˆ, S)
Using (13), (41), (??), and (40) the social planners problem can be written
as (15)
Appendix 2
19This substitution is convenient since by adopting it we do not need a seperate state
equation for human capital. It does not however aﬀect the basic results of this section
regarding the interpretation of the unpaid part of energy associated with emissions gen-
erated by energy use.
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Consumers Defining the current value Hamiltonian for the problem as:
H = U (c, S) + π (w + ra− c+ na+ τz) (42)
standard optimality conditions imply:
Uc (c, S) = π , Ucc (c, S) c˙ = π˙ (43)
π˙ = (ρ− r)π or (44)
c˙
c
=
1
θ
(r − ρ) (45)
Firms The representative firm maximizes profits (7) assuming that phys-
ical capital, human capital and loans are perfect substitutes as stores of
value we have r = RK − δ = RH − δ.The profit function for the firm can
be written in per worker terms, using the Cobb-Douglas specification and
setting k = kˆeξt, h = hˆeξt, and ζ − ξ + a1ξ + a2ξ = 0, ξ = ζ − a1ξ − a2ξ as:
Π
L
= eξt
∙
f
³
kˆ, hˆ, E
´
−RK kˆ −RH hˆ− we−ξt − pE eˆL − τ
ψ (E)
L
e−ξt(¸46)
ζ = ξ − a1ξ − a2ξ (47)
In equilibrium firms take RK , RH , w, pE and τ as given and maximize
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for any given level lˆ = Leξt by setting:
fkˆ = RK = r + δ (48)
fhˆ = RH = r + δ (49)
fE =
pE + τψ0(E)
lˆ
⇒ fE lˆ = pE + τψ0(E)20 (50)
eξt
h
f
³
kˆ, hˆ, E
´
− fkˆkˆ − fhˆhˆ− (pE + τψE (E)) eLe
−ξt
i
= w, (51)
eˆL = eLe−ξt =
E
L
e−ξt (52)
eξt
h
f
³
kˆ, hˆ, E
´
− fkˆkˆ − fhˆhˆ−
³
fE lˆ
´
eLe−ξt
i
= w (53)
Competitive equilibrium implies that profits are zero. By substituting (48)-
(59) into (46) the zero profit condition implies:
f
³
kˆ, hˆ, E
´
−RK kˆ −RH hˆ
−eξt
h
f
³
kˆ, hˆ, E
´
− fkˆkˆ − fhˆhˆ−
¡
pE + τψ0 (E)
¢
eLe−ξt
i
e−ξt −
pEeLe−ξt − τ
ψ (E)
L
e−ξt = 0 (54)
For the zero profit condition to hold it is necessary that:
τψ0 (E)
E
L
e−ξt = τ
ψ (E)
L
e−ξt
which implies that
ψ0 (E)E = ψ (E) or
dψ (E)
dE
E
ψ (E)
= 1 (55)
Therefore, existence of competitive equilibrium when the emissions em-
bodied to energy are taxed, requires that the emission function has unit
elasticity with respect to energy or that it can be written as Z = σE.
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Equilibrium In equilibrium a = k+h so aˆ = kˆ+ hˆ . Then the flow budget
constraint:
a˙ = w + ra− c− na+ τz (56)
can be written as:
k˙ + h˙ = w + r (k + h)− c− n (k + h) + τz (57)
Setting as before k = kˆeξt and h = hˆeξt, c = cˆeξt, and taking the time
derivatives of k and h we obtain:
·
kˆeξt + ξkˆeξt +
·
hˆeξt + ξhˆeξt = (58)
w + r
³
kˆeξt + hˆeξt
´
− cˆeξt − n
³
kˆeξt + hˆeξt
´
+ τz
substituting (48)-(51) into (??), and using in equilibrium r = fkˆ−δ = fhˆ−δ,
fE lˆ = pE + τψ0(E), lˆ = Leξt we obtain:
·
kˆ+
·
hˆ = f
³
kˆ, hˆ, E
´
−(n+ δ + ξ) (kˆ+hˆ)−cˆ−pE eˆL−τψ0 (E)
E
L
e−ξt+τ
ψ (E)
L
e−ξt
using (55) we have:
·
kˆ +
·
hˆ = kˆa1 hˆa2Ea4 − cˆ− pE eˆL − (η + δ + ξ)(kˆ + hˆ) (59)
Using as above the assumption that in equilibrium the allocation between
physical and human capital is such that the marginal products for each type
of capital are equated if we use both forms of investment, we have as before
a1 yˆtkˆt − δ = a2
yˆt
hˆt
− δ and hˆ = a2a1 kˆ ,
·
hˆ = a2a1
·
kˆ. Then (59) becomes
·
kˆ = f
³
kˆ, E
´
− αcˆ− αpE eˆL − (η + δ + ξ) kˆ , f
³
kˆ, E
´
= sA˜kˆβEa4 (60)
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which is the social planners transition equation (??).
Setting c = cˆeξt and c˙ = ξcˆeξt +
·
cˆeξt into (45) we obtain
·
cˆ
cˆ
=
1
θ
h
fkˆ
³
kˆ, E
´
− ρ− δ − ξθ
i
− UcˆS (cˆ, S)
Ucˆcˆ (cˆ, S)
S˙ (61)
Under optimal taxation τ = −λlˆ/p. We have therefore, from the so-
cial planner’s problem that fE
³
kˆ, E
´
lˆ = pE −
³
λψ0 (E, t) lˆ
´
/p with p =
Ucˆ (cˆ, S) , E = g
³
kˆ, λ, p, lˆ
´
while from the firms problem, (??), we have
fE
³
kˆ, E
´
lˆ = pE + τψ0(E). The optimality conditions for the choice of en-
ergy coincide. It should be noticed that τ/lˆ = −λ/p, that is the tax per
eﬀective worker is equal to the shadow cost of emissions expressed in utility
terms.
Substituting E into (61) and (12) we obtain:
·
cˆ
cˆ
=
1
θ
h
fkˆ
³
kˆ, g
³
kˆ, λ, Ucˆ (cˆ, S) , lˆ
´´
− ρ− δ − θξ
i
− UcˆS (cˆ, S)
Ucˆcˆ (cˆ, S)
S˙ (62)
S˙ = ψ
h
g
³
kˆ, λ, Ucˆ (cˆ, S) , lˆ
´
, t
i
−mS (63)
The dynamic system (60), (62) and (63) determines the evolution of
³
cˆ, kˆ, S
´
in a decentralized competitive equilibrium under optimal emission taxation.
By comparing them with (22), (24) and (25) it is clear that the path of
the decentralized competitive equilibrium under optimal emission taxation
coincides with the socially optimal path.
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